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The Science of DNA Identification: From the
Laboratory to the Courtroom (and Beyond)
David H. Kaye ∗
For much of the Twentieth Century, the scientific icon was
the atom. This was the “atomic age”—a period of atomic
bombs, atomic submarines, atomic clocks, and nuclear
medicine. As the Twenty-first Century unrolls, the dominant
scientific icon is no longer the atom; it is the double helix, the
The sequences of the
backbone of the DNA molecule. 1
“nucleotide base pairs” that link the two strands of the double
helix are seen by some bioethicists as the “secret future
diaries” of human beings 2 and by some scientists as “in
essence, . . . what makes humans human.” 3
This imagery and essentialism is exaggerated, 4 but that is
a topic for another occasion. This article will focus on
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This article was derived from a Deinard Memorial Lecture on Law and
Medicine, at the University of Minnesota Law School, on January 31, 2006.
1. See DOROTHY NELKIN & M. SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE
GENE AS A CULTURAL ICON (1995); Dorothy Nelkin, Molecular Metaphors: The
Gene in Popular Discourse, 2 NATURE REV. GENETICS 555 (2001).
2. George J. Annas, Privacy Rules for DNA Databanks: Protecting
Coded ‘Future Diaries,’ 270 JAMA 2346 (1993).
3. Julie Meyne, The Human Genome Project: Impact on the Prevalence
of
Diabetes,
Aug.
1997,
http://darwin.nmsu.edu/~molbio/diabetes/human.html. Cf. Nicholas Wade,
Life Is Pared to Basics, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1999, at F3 (reporting the
concern expressed by a medical ethicist that “when biologists sequenced the
first human chromosome last month, they called it ‘the first chapter in the
book of life, as if life is chromosomes’”).
4. See, e.g., RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX: GENE, ORGANISM,
AND ENVIRONMENT (2000); Eric T. Juengst, FACE Facts: Why Human
Genetics Will Always Provoke Bioethics, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 267 (2004).
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sequences of DNA base-pairs that are of little or no importance
in medicine but that have become exceedingly important in
law. I refer to the genetic features used by forensic scientists
to characterize biological trace evidence that contains DNA—
primarily blood stains, semen, saliva, and hair. The variations
in DNA sequences, which are found at particular locations, or
“loci,” in the genome, are known as “alleles.” Matching DNA
alleles can be used to ascertain the likely source of a crimescene sample and to establish family relationships. Testimony
as to these DNA loci has appeared in cases of child support,
domestic relations, immigration and naturalization, slander,
and even judicial discipline. But it is the criminal justice
system that has benefited the most from forensic DNA
identification, both in terms of exonerating the innocent and
convicting the guilty.
This article will survey the history, nature, and uses of the
science of human DNA identification as it has moved from the
laboratory to the courtroom. Part I describes the process by
which courts admit (or exclude) scientific evidence and how
scientists have responded to the legal milieu. The tale is one
of legal doctrine, of lawyers and their limitations, of courts and
confusion, of journalists and misreporting, and of adversarial
science and egos. 5 Part II moves from these doctrinal and
historical developments in the law of evidence to several of the
ethical, social, and constitutional questions created by current
developments in forensic DNA analysis, and by the creation
and expansion of forensic DNA repositories and databases.
I. THE LEGAL ACCEPTANCE OF DNA IDENTIFICATION
EVIDENCE
Only a few concepts from the law of evidence are needed to
describe the judicial response to efforts to introduce DNA
5. The historical survey pretermits the use of DNA typing in postconviction relief. These cases have played an extremely important role in
criminal justice, but they are less directly connected to admissibility issues.
For discussions of DNA exonerations, see EDWARD CONNORS ET AL.,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE
OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996); BARRY
SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000); Paul C. Giannelli,
Impact of Post-Conviction DNA Testing on Forensic Science, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 627 (2001); Seth F. Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double
Bind: Factual Innocence and Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
547 (2002).
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evidence. All expert witnesses—scientific and otherwise—are
expected to have specialized knowledge that can assist the jury
in understanding the facts.
In almost all jurisdictions,
however, scientific experts must clear an additional hurdle.
This special scrutiny of scientific methodology varies among
jurisdictions, but two major standards have emerged, the
general-acceptance standard and the Daubert standard. The
general-acceptance standard, introduced in a 1923 case
entitled Frye v. United States, requires proof that most
knowledgeable scientists accept a theory or technique as valid
and reliable. 6 The Daubert standard, adopted in 1993 in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, does not treat
general acceptance among scientists as definitive but considers
it to be one factor that helps demonstrate the underlying
validity of the theory. 7 The two standards are quite flexible
and depend entirely on the rigor with which the court chooses
to apply them. 8
Starting in the late 1980s, courts across the country began
to apply these standards to DNA evidence. 9 The ensuing legal
history can be divided into at least four phases: (1) a period of
uncritical acceptance of Variable Number Tandem Repeat
(VNTR) typing; (2) serious challenges to analytical methods
and the statistical interpretation of the results; (3) renewed
acceptance of DNA evidence; and (4) acceptance of more
advanced systems of DNA analysis.
A. PHASE I: UNCRITICAL ACCEPTANCE OF VNTRS
The first genetic loci used in forensic testing were
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLPs). These
are variations in the length of the DNA sequence between two
sites at which bacterial enzymes cut the long DNA molecule
into pieces. For example, the population might include some
people with 3,200 base pairs between the two restriction sites,
some with 1,200 base pairs, and some with both (one on each
chromosome).
Human geneticists had been using RFLP
technology for years as markers for mutations that produced

6. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. See D.H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EXPERT EVIDENCE (2004).
9. By the end of the 1980s, a substantial minority of federal circuits and
states had rejected the general-acceptance standard of Frye in favor of a
“reliability-plus” standard comparable to Daubert. See id.
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genetic diseases. These markers, however, were usually
simple systems with a few easily distinguishable alleles, such
as the two postulated above.
The type of loci that proved powerful enough for human
identification was discovered serendipitously in 1984 by
geneticist, Sir Alec Jeffries, at the University of Leicester. 10
These VNTR loci involve many possible alleles that are almost
continuous in their lengths. A short sequence of base pairs is
repeated, back to back, various numbers of times. Instead of
only two possible alleles (such as the 1,200 and 3,200 base-pair
alleles), there can be many alleles of different lengths. The
lengths have no medical significance, but they do give rise to
measurable differences that enable analysts to distinguish
among different individuals. Figure 1 is an “autoradiograph”
showing the alleles of one VNTR locus in eleven different
people. The DNA fragments, which carry a negative charge,
have been pulled through a slab of gelatinous material by an
electric field so that they have moved distances proportional to
their lengths. The dark spots mark the final positions of the
fragments. Shorter fragments have moved farther down the
gel. Each person has either one or two alleles (discernibly
different fragment lengths) that appear in each vertical lane.
FIGURE 1. AUTORADIOGRAPH OF VNTR ALLELES AT A SINGLE LOCUS IN
ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS 11

10. See Alec J. Jeffreys, Highly Variable Minisatellites and DNA
Fingerprints, 15 BIOCHEMICAL SOC’Y TRANS. 309 (1987); Alec J. Jeffreys et
al., DNA “Fingerprints” and Segregation Analysis of Multiple Markers in
Human Pedigrees, 39 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 11 (1986); A.J. Jeffreys et al.,
Individual-Specific ‘Fingerprints’ of Human DNA, 316 NATURE 76 (1985);
Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable “Minisatellite” Regions in Human DNA,
314 NATURE 67 (1985).
11. The autoradiograph was produced by the FBI in 1988. It is
reproduced from OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, GENETIC WITNESS:
FORENSIC USES OF DNA TESTS 47 (1990).
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In the earliest DNA cases, the technology was the subject
of lopsided testimony. In some instances, defendants objected
that the technology as adapted to forensic usage was not
generally accepted or adequately validated, but they produced
no experts to question the claim of general acceptance. In one
Texas case, Kelly v. State, 12 the defense produced an expert
who, as the court delicately put it, “was certified to teach life
and earth sciences in public schools” and who testified that
radioactivity, which had been introduced into medicine in the
late 1930s, 13 was too new to be generally accepted. 14 Not
surprisingly, this idiosyncratic view did not prevail over the
unequivocal assurances of general acceptance from three
university or medical school professors who testified for the
prosecution.
The courts in these lopsided cases had little difficulty
finding general acceptance or scientific validity. 15 Such cases
can have a snowball or avalanche effect. Other courts cite
them as having found general acceptance or scientific validity.
The snowball grows until it becomes an avalanche,
increasingly difficult to stop even if there are serious grounds
to question the scientific technique. This is currently the
situation with dermatoglyphic fingerprinting. Fingerprints
obviously are highly variable, but the validity and reliability of
analysts working with latent prints of varying quality have not
been rigorously studied. Yet, because the technique is so well
ensconced, courts have been reluctant to apply faithfully the
Daubert standard of scientific validity. 16
B. PHASE II: CHALLENGES TO ANALYTICAL METHODS,
STATISTICS, AND POPULATION GENETICS MODELS
Despite the initial momentum of DNA evidence, defense
counsel were able to raise important questions. The details of
the laboratory procedures were questioned, and limitations
were identified in the statistical and population-genetics
models used in estimating the frequencies of the DNA types.
12. 792 S.W.2d 579, 583 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
13. See, e.g., João José Pedroso de Lima, Radioisotopes in Medicine, 19
EUROPEAN J. PHYSICS 485, 485 (1998).
14. Radioactive isotopes are used in producing the bands in the
autoradiograph.
15. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 205(B) (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th
ed. 2006).
16. See, e.g., id. § 207(A).
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One case that undermined judicial confidence is People v.
Castro. 17 In this case, the defense found strong grounds to
question the interpretation of the DNA tests conducted by
Lifecodes, a commercial laboratory specializing in forensic
DNA testing. The defense witnesses included Eric Lander, a
mathematician-turned-biologist at MIT who was to become a
leader in the Human Genome Project. Richard Roberts, who
was to receive the Noble prize a few years later, testified for
the state at a twelve-week hearing that resulted in a
transcript of some 5,000 written pages.
Judge Gerald
Sheindlin, who went on to write two books on DNA evidence, 18
excluded the testimony of a DNA match, referring to the
defense’s “piercing attack on each molecule of evidence.” 19
When scientists of this caliber differ, courts normally are
at a loss to decide who is right. Here, the court had no
difficulty.
After reviewing Lander’s concerns, Roberts
proposed that the scientists for both parties meet without the
lawyers. This unchaperoned tête-à-tête resulted in a joint
statement concluding that “the DNA data in this case are not
scientifically reliable enough to support the assertion that the
samples do or do not match.” 20 The scientists subscribing to
the statement agreed that Lifecodes had failed to perform
experiments that might have explained certain anomalous
bands and that the reported probability of a random match
“understates the actual probability.” 21
Despite the defects in the laboratory work in Castro and a
few other cases, most courts continued to find forensic RFLP17. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. 1989). Indeed, Castro was said to be “the first
serious challenge to DNA ‘fingerprinting.’” Robert D. Mcfadden, Reliability of
DNA Testing Challenged by Judge’s Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1989, at B1.
According to Clay Strange,
what had been widely accepted in the press and hailed as a major
advance was now viewed skeptically, even as unreliable by one New
York Times reporter. The fact that Castro was based “on technical
aspects of a particular case and not the fundamental scientific
validity of DNA technology” was obscured.
Clay Strange, Book Review, DNA’s Search for Truth, 83 JUDICATURE 165, 166
(1999).
18. BLOOD TRAIL: TRUE CRIME MYSTERIES SOLVED BY DNA DETECTIVES
(1996); GENETIC FINGERPRINTING: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF DNA EVIDENCE
(1996).
19. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
20. Roger Parloff, How Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld Tripped Up the
DNA Experts, AM. LAWYER., Dec. 1989, at 1.
21. Id.
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VNTR analyses to be generally accepted, and a number of
states provided for admissibility of DNA tests by legislation. 22
A more sweeping attack on DNA profiling that began in
Castro led to a wave of cases in which many courts held that
estimates of the probability of a coincidentally matching VNTR
profile were inadmissible.
These estimates relied on a
simplified population-genetics model for the frequencies of
VNTR profiles that treats each race as a large, randomly
mating population. Some prominent scientists claimed that
the applicability of the model had not been adequately verified
and that it was inaccurate because ethnic or religious
subgroups tend to mate preferentially among themselves. 23 A
heated debate on the significance of this population
substructure spilled over from courthouses to scientific
journals and convinced the supreme courts of several states
that general acceptance was lacking. 24 A 1992 report of the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), as a compromise,
proposed a more “conservative” computational method, dubbed
“the ceiling principle” by its inventor and National Research
Council committee member, Eric Lander. 25 The apparent need
for a compromise seemed to undermine the claim of scientific
acceptance of the less conservative procedure that was in
general use. Other NAS recommendations (for improvements
in quality control and assurance and more objective standards
for declaring matches) also were seen by some observers as
demanding the exclusion of DNA evidence. An article by New
York Times biomedical reporter Gina Kolata propounded a

22. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.25. This statute provides that
In a civil or criminal trial or hearing, the results of DNA analysis . . .
are admissible in evidence without antecedent expert testimony that
DNA analysis provides a trustworthy and reliable method of
identifying characteristics in an individual’s genetic material upon a
showing that the offered testimony meets the standards for
admissibility set forth in the Rules of Evidence.
Presumably, it is intended to relieve the state of the burden of showing that a
particular DNA typing method satisfies Frye (the standard used in
Minnesota), but, by and large, the Minnesota courts have studiously ignored
it. See, e.g., State v. Kromah, 657 N.W.2d 564 (Minn. 2003).
23. See, e.g., Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts over DNA Fingerprinting: A
Bitter Debate Is Raging over How the Results of this New Forensic Technique
Are Interpreted in Court, 254 SCIENCE 1721 (1991)
24. See David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics,
and the Courts, 7 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 101 (1993).
25. COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL
COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC
SCIENCE (1992).
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particularly tendentious view of the report. 26 After a special
press conference called by Victor McCusick, the chairman of
the committee, the New York Times (grudgingly if you read the
fine print) confessed error. 27
C. PHASE III: RENEWED ACCEPTANCE
At this juncture the legal history entered a third phase.
The 1992 NAS report’s advocacy of the “ceiling principle” for
computing random-match probabilities without assuming
random mating within broadly defined races came in for
withering criticism. Many population geneticists regarded this
procedure as ad hoc and excessively conservative. 28 Before
long, the procedure was denigrated as being neither a “ceiling”
nor a “principle.” 29 In 1996, a second NAS panel concluded
that data collected on subpopulations from across the world
confirmed that the usual method of estimating frequencies of
VNTR profiles in broad racial groups generally was sound. 30
Moreover, in the period between the two reports, an FBI
geneticist and Eric Lander joined forces to write commentary
in Nature with the reassuring title “DNA Fingerprinting
Dispute Laid to Rest.” 31 The article pointed to improvements
in laboratory standards and additional research into
subpopulations.
Impressed with Lander’s sudden, public
conversion to the view that the population-genetics issues were
no longer serious obstacles to admissibility, and reassured by
the 1996 NAS report, courts began to regard concerns over
population substructure as passé. In this manner, the courts
almost invariably returned to the earlier view that the
statistics associated with VNTR profiling are generally
accepted and scientifically valid both in major population
26. Gina Kolata, U.S. Panel Seeking Restrictions On Use of DNA in
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1992, at A1. The article began by claiming that
the committee had said that DNA typing “should not be allowed in court in
the future unless a more scientific basis is established.” It insisted that “[t]he
new report . . . says courts should cease to admit DNA evidence . . . .” Id.
27. Gina Kolata, Chief Says Panel Backs Courts’ Use of a Genetic Test,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A23.
28. See Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report as Scientifically
Flawed, 259 SCIENCE 755 (1993).
29. Kaye, supra note 24.
30. COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996).
31. Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid
to Rest, 371 NATURE 735 (1994).
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groups and in subgroups. 32
D. PHASE IV: ACCEPTANCE OF PCR-BASED METHODS
In the final phase of the judicial acceptance of DNA
evidence, prosecutors moved away from VNTR loci and
introduced matches based on other DNA features. Analysis of
these sites of DNA variation was made possible by the use of
the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). Discovered by the
colorful Kary Mullis, 33 PCR is a chemical process that makes
copies of small DNA fragments, then copies of copies, then
copies of all those copies, and so on. 34 Contrary to the
nomenclature of many judicial opinions, PCR is not a forensic
typing method. It is simply a preliminary step. Once the
particular loci of interest have been “amplified,” perhaps a
million-fold, with PCR, they can be analyzed in various ways.
The most common procedure examines Short Tandem Repeat
(STR) loci, which have a core element of a handful of base
pairs repeated a relatively small number of times. Per locus,
they are less variable than VNTRs, but much easier to
measure and interpret. 35
As results obtained with the PCR-based methods entered
the courtroom, it became necessary to ask whether these
methods also rested on a solid scientific foundation or were

32. Two cases illustrate these developments. In People v. Miller, 670
N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1996), the Supreme Court of Illinois observed that “while
there has been some controversy over the use of the product rule in
calculating the frequency of a DNA match, that controversy appears to be
dissipating.” Id. at 731-32. The court cited the Lander-Budowle paper as proof
that “[t]he concerns . . . appear not to have been borne out by empirical
studies.” Id. at 732. The next year, in People v. Hickey, 687 N.E.2d 910 (Ill.
1997), the same court determined that a Frye hearing no longer was required
in light of Miller and the fact that
[t]he 1996 report concludes that “[t]he state of the profiling
technology and the methods for estimating frequencies and related
statistics have progressed to the point where the admissibility of
properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt”
and that the report “also specifically concludes that sufficient data
have been gathered to establish that the interim ceiling principle is
not needed and further recommends that, in general, the calculation
of a profile frequency should be made with the product rule.”
Id. at 291.
33. See KARY MULLIS, DANCING NAKED IN THE MIND FIELD (1998); Emily
Yoffe, Is Kary Mullis God?, ESQUIRE, July 1, 1994, at 68.
34. See, e.g., PCR TECHNOLOGY: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS FOR DNA
AMPLIFICATION (H.A. Erlich ed., 1989).
35. See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF STR MARKERS (2d ed. 2005).
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generally accepted in the scientific community. The opinions
were practically unanimous in holding that the current
laboratory procedures for STR typing (as well as earlier
systems) satisfy these standards. 36 They also held that the socalled “product rule” for estimating the frequencies of DNA
types in major population groups is scientifically sound and
generally accepted for the loci investigated in these tests. 37
In sum, in little more than a decade, DNA typing made
the transition from a novel set of methods for identification to
a relatively mature and well studied forensic technology.
Although some of the defense objections in this period seem
misconceived or overblown, the adversary system is structured
to exaggerate or amplify differences in the scientific
community. Moreover, whatever hyperbole there was—and
there was hyperbole on both sides—the defense criticisms
contributed to improvements in protocols, more extensive
proficiency testing, and research in population genetics and
statistics.
II. EMERGING ETHICAL, SOCIAL, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Although the most significant issues related to the
admissibility of forensic DNA testing have been resolved,
several aspects of the investigative phase of DNA work remain
highly contentious. These include inferring race or ethnicity
from crime-scene samples, acquiring DNA samples without
consent or judicial warrants, and amassing and using DNA
databases for law-enforcement purposes.
A. INFERRING RACE OR ETHNICITY FROM CRIME-SCENE
SAMPLES
A former official at the National Human Genome Research
Institute stated: “Of high concern to us is the use of DNA as a
high-tech form of racial profiling, [to determine the]
probabilities . . . of an individual being from this race or that
ethnic group.” 38 But why should this practice be considered
36. 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 32:3 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2006).
37. See cases cited in id.
38. Kathy Hudson, Keynote Address at the American University Law
Review Symposium: The Human Genome Project, DNA Science and the Law:
The American Legal System’s Response to Breakthroughs in Genetic Science
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“racial profiling”? In some cases, the crime-scene sample will
point to African-Americans; in others, it will point to Whites.
There is no pre-established racial profile.
For Equal
Protection purposes, it is comparable to relying on an
eyewitness’s description of the culprit as Asian, or Hispanic, or
Black, or White to focus an investigation. 39 Admittedly, the
categories are socially constructed and imperfectly correlated
with genetic markers, but anthropologists have produced
ancestry-informative markers (AIMs), 40 and they may be
roughly indicative of physical features. 41 If genetic analysis of
ancestry is reasonably accurate, one could argue that it is
protective of the rights of minorities, as it reduces the risk of
initial stereotyping and focuses the investigation on the group
where it belongs.
B. ACQUISITION OF SUSPECTS’ DNA
Many more civil-liberties issues arise when police seek to
acquire DNA samples from suspects for comparison to samples
from crime scenes. 42 The government must conform to the
Fourth Amendment, which refers to “[t]he right of the people
to be secure . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures”
and specifies that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause . . . .” 43 However, precisely when a judicial warrant and
probable cause is required is not always apparent.
The questions here include the following: (1) May police go

(Oct. 19, 2001), in 51 AM. U. L. REV. 431, 442 (2002).
39. Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA Typing: Emerging or
Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 447-51 (2001).
40. E.g., Heather E. Collins-Schramm et al., Mexican American AncestryInformative Markers: Examination of Population Structure and Marker
Characteristics in European Americans, Mexican Americans, Amerindians
and Asian, 114 HUM. GENETICS 263 (2004); Mary-Anne Enoch et al., Using
Ancestry-Informative Markers to Define Populations and Detect Population
Stratification, 20 J. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 19 (2006).
41. The commercial firm, DNAPrint, offers the following service to police
agencies: “DNAWitnessTM will provide the percentage of genetic make up
amongst the four possible groups of Sub-Saharan African, Native American,
East
Asian,
and
European.”
DNAPrint
Home
Page,
http://www.dnaprint.com/welcome/productsandservices/forensics/ (last visited
Apr. 11, 2007). The company advertises that “We have performed about
13,000 ‘blind’ tests to date. For example, one west coast police department
sent 16 samples collected from members of the department. The results were
judged by them to be correct (consistent with phenotype and self-held notions
of ancestry) for all 16 samples.” Id.
42. See generally Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 39.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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door-to-door, or car-to-car, canvassing for “voluntary” DNA
samples but threatening individuals with becoming targets for
further investigation if they refuse to cooperate? (2) May the
state obtain tissue samples from medical providers without the
knowledge or consent of the donor? 44 (3) If DNA is extracted
without any bodily intrusion (for example, by following a
suspect and collecting shed hairs or saliva from a beer mug at
a bar), is there a search that must be justified under the
Fourth Amendment? (4) May police trick a suspect into
providing DNA, for example, by mailing the suspect a letter on
law firm stationery saying he is eligible for money in a classaction lawsuit and then recovering saliva from the envelope
containing the claim form? 45
Most of these practices have been undertaken, and lower
courts have approved of some of them. 46 Certainly, some
deception in interrogations 47 and the warrantless collection of
“abandoned” possessions 48 are accepted with regard to
acquiring other types of information in criminal investigations.
To reach a different conclusion here would be to indulge in
“genetics exceptionalism,” and that is precisely what some
legal commentators have proposed. 49
44. There are reports that this was done in Wichita to see if Dennis
Rader might be the notorious BTK killer. See Readers Still Want Answers on
BTK, WICHITA EAGLE, July 3, 2005 (reporting that
In an effort to hide from Rader that they were zeroing in on him as a
BTK suspect, investigators obtained a subpoena for his daughter’s
DNA from a tissue sample stored at a medical clinic in Kansas. It
was processed within a week before Rader’s arrest on Feb. 25. After
Rader was arrested, authorities took a DNA sample from his
daughter at her Michigan home to help confirm earlier test results.).
45. See Tracy Johnson, Convicted Murderer Says Officers Broke Law with
DNA Trick Police Ruse Case Argued, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REP.,
Jan. 27, 2006, at B1.
46. E.g., State v. Buckman, 613 N.W.2d 463 (Neb. 2000) (defendant
abandoned cigarette butt with saliva in police station).
47. See, e.g., Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990) (“Miranda
warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to
a[n undercover] law enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement”).
48. See John P. Ludington, Search and Seizure: What Constitutes
Abandonment of Personal Property Within Rule That Search and Seizure of
Abandoned Property Is Not Unreasonable—Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4th 381
(1985).
49. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth
Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857 (2006) (concluding
that courts are unlikely to extend Fourth Amendment protection to “covert
involuntary DNA sampling” but advocating a statutory requirement for a
warrant).
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C. DNA DATABASES
In addition to the traditional use of trace evidence to show
the presence of a known suspect at a crime scene, all American
states, the federal government, and many other countries have
compelled convicted offenders to provide DNA samples for the
creation of computer-searchable databases of their identifying
profiles. These are used when there is no known suspect to
test. There are over four million records in the FBI’s National
Database Index System (NDIS). The DNA records consist of
the STRs at thirteen loci selected by the FBI for common use.
The numbers are similar to passport or Social Security
numbers in that they are essentially arbitrary strings of digits
assigned by nature. 50
These databases help police to solve cases that have
baffled them for decades and to catch previously convicted
offenders who commit new crimes. In Virginia, there was the
rapist who blew out a candle before attacking his victim. The
candle had his saliva on it. There was the burglar who wore a
pair of socks on his hands and left no fingerprints. But he left
the socks that contained skin cells. There was the bank robber
who dropped his ski mask. All were identified by checking the
DNA profiles against the state’s database of convicted felons. 51
At the outset, privacy advocates maintained that sexoffender databases were just the camel’s nose and the
government would follow up with greatly expanded databases.
They were correct. The trend is toward all-felons databases. 52

50. Professor Joh asserts that “some markers now thought to be
meaningless may be (and have been) found to contain predictive medical
information as the science progresses.” Id. at 870. The basis for this claim is
flimsy. None of the NDIS markers are known to be predictive or diagnostic of
any medical condition. The news stories on which Professor Joh relies do not
suggest otherwise. D.H. Kaye, Science Fiction and Shed DNA, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 62 (2006).
51. Profile: Use of a DNA Data Bank to Catch Criminals in Virginia,
(Nat’l Public Radio Morning Edition, Mar. 8, 2001), available at 2001 WL
9326731.
52. See, e.g., Amy Norton, DNA Databases: The New Dragnet, 19 THE
SCIENTIST 50 (2005); Rick Weiss, Vast DNA Bank Pits Policing vs. Privacy:
Data Stored on 3 Million Americans, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1 (“At
least 38 states now have laws to collect DNA from people found guilty of
misdemeanors, in some cases for such crimes as shoplifting and
fortunetelling. At least 28 now collect from juvenile offenders, too.”). The
experience with expanded databases has greatly undermined the prediction
of the first National Academy committee that “it is clear that crimes of most
types will not afford the opportunity to recover relevant biological evidence
that will allow the police to identify an unknown suspect—i.e., the
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Furthermore, the individuals who might be implicated by
DNA database searches are not necessarily limited to those
whose samples are in the database. 53 When a Winston-Salem
newspaper editor was raped and killed in 2003, the DNA trace
did not fully match anything in the database, but one
convicted offender was a near match.
This similarity
suggested that although the criminal whose DNA was on file
was not the murderer, a sibling might be. Sure enough,
detectives found that there was a brother. By following the
brother, detectives were able to collect DNA evidence from
saliva he left on discarded cigarette butts. His DNA proved to
be a perfect match to the sample from the crime scene. 54 Does
such “near-match searching” infringe any rights or exceed
statutory authority, or is it simply a clever investigative
practice? 55
Concerns also have been voiced with regard to the uses to
which the DNA data and samples might be put. 56 Some
bioethicists and law professors have claimed that the laws
countenance research with offender records or samples in
violation of the Nuremburg Code and the basic principle of
medical ethics and human rights that forbids medical
experimentation on human subjects. 57 The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) fears that the government will use the
samples in a search “for a crime gene . . . .” 58
perpetrator’s own body fluids. They include larcenies, burglaries, and
assaults . . . .” COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE,
supra note 25, at 120.
53. See, e.g., Frederick R. Bieber et al., Human Genetics: Finding
Criminals Through DNA of Their Relatives, 312 SCIENCE 1315 (2006); David
R. Paoletti et al., Assessing the Implications for Close Relatives in the Event of
Similar But Nonmatching DNA Profiles, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 161 (2006).
54. Richard Willing, Suspects Get Snared by a Relative’s DNA, USA
TODAY, June 8, 2005, at A1. This proof of the brother’s guilt triggered the
release from prison of Darryl Hunt, who had been imprisoned for the past
eighteen years. Id.
55. The most thoughtful analysis of this question published to date is
Henry T. Greely et al., Family Ties: The Use of DNA Offender Databases to
Catch Offenders’ Kin, 34 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 248 (2006).
56. See D.H. Kaye, Bioethics, Bench, and Bar: Selected Arguments in
Landry v. Attorney General, 40 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2000).
57. Brief for Institute for Science, Law and Technology and Illinois
Institute of Technology as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, Landry v.
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999) (No. SJC-07899).
58. Interview by Ira Flatow with Nadine Strossen, on National Public
Radio
Talk
of
the
Nation,
(May
25,
2001),
available
at
http://www.sciencefriday.com/pages/2001/May/hour1_052501.html; see also
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In my opinion, claims like these are grossly overstated.
The kinds of research that are allowed are far less threatening
than pawing through millions of personally identified samples
for a mythical “crime gene.” The federal DNA Identification
Act of 1994 limits research to “identification research and
protocol development purposes,” and then only “if personally
The states must
identifiable information is removed.” 59
adhere to the same privacy protections if they are to receive
federal funding for their forensic DNA laboratories. 60
Criminal DNA databases also prompt Fourth Amendment
concerns. 61 Several states have adopted laws to take DNA
from people when they are merely brought into custody. With
almost no publicity, President Bush signed comparable federal
legislation into law. 62 Almost without exception, courts have
held that convicted offenders can be compelled to contribute
their DNA without probable cause (or any sort of
individualized suspicion) and without a warrant. 63 They have

Speeding DNA Evidence Processing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (2000) (testimony of Barry
Steinhardt, Associate Director, American Civil Liberties Union, Washington,
D.C.) (describing DNA samples as harboring our “most intimate secrets,”
possibly including “genetic markers for aggression, substance addiction,
criminal tendencies and sexual orientation”), available at 2000 WL 342540.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b) (2000).
60. For a more thorough analysis of the DNA database statutes, see D.H.
Kaye, Behavioral Genetics Research and Criminal DNA Databases, 69 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 259 (2006).
61. Much of my discussion of this issue is contained in D. H. Kaye, Who
Needs Special Needs? On the Constitutionality of Collecting DNA and Other
Biometric Data from Arrestees, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 188 (2006), which
pursues the matter in greater depth.
62. Section 1004(a)(1)(A) of the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 amended
the DNA Identification Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14132, by providing that
“[t]he Attorney General may, as prescribed by the Attorney General in
regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested or from
non-United States persons who are detained under the authority of the
United States.” As codified, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a) provides that
[t]he Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may establish
an index of—(1) DNA identification records of—(A) persons convicted
of crimes; (B) persons who have been charged in an indictment or
information with a crime; and (C) other persons whose DNA samples
are collected under applicable legal authorities, provided that DNA
samples that are voluntarily submitted solely for elimination
purposes shall not be included in the National DNA Index System.
63. See Robin Cheryl Miller, Validity, Construction, and Operation of
State DNA Database Statutes, 76 A.L.R.5th 239 (2000); Richard P. Shafer,
Validity, Construction, and Application of DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 14135 et seq. and 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565, 187 A.L.R.
Fed. 373 (2003).
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done so on two theories. The first theory looks to Supreme
Court cases that dispense with the warrant requirement
“when ‘special needs beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
Certain programs of
requirement impracticable.’” 64
compulsory drug testing of federal employees, for example,
have been upheld as reasonable because they serve the
government’s special interest as an employer in reducing the
use of drugs in its work force or in safeguarding the public
with whom these employees deal. 65
However, the Supreme Court has cut back on this
exception by blocking its extension to programs whose
“primary purpose” is the enforcement of criminal law. For
example, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 66 the Medical
University of South Carolina began testing urine samples from
pregnant patients for drugs to build criminal cases that would
induce them to accept substance-abuse treatment. Because
“the immediate objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes,” 67 the Supreme Court
held that the testing program could not be sustained under the
special-needs doctrine.
The logic of the primary-purpose limitation is not entirely
clear. It seems odd to maintain that the balance of interests
permits dispensing with warrants or individualized suspicion
when non-law enforcement interests alone are pursued, but
not when both law enforcement and non-law enforcement
interests reinforce each other.
Be that as it may, the
convicted-offender databases exist primarily to facilitate the
identification of the perpetrators of sexual assaults, murders,
and many other crimes. They have some secondary uses, such
as identifying missing persons or disaster victims, but criminal
investigation is their raison d’etre.
Thus, the special-needs doctrine (as articulated in
Ferguson) is a poor fit to DNA databases. Many courts
therefore have taken a different tack. Without explaining
why, they either have abandoned the notion that there needs

64. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
65. E.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602
(1989).
66. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
67. Id. at 83.
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to be a categorical exception to the warrant requirement, or
they have a created a sui generis exception for DNA databases.
These courts maintain that the DNA data are extremely useful
in preventing and investigating crime, while the bodily
intrusion is minimal, the personal information only reveals
individual identity, and the individuals’ status as a convicted
criminal diminishes his privacy. In this way, they have upheld
taking DNA after conviction. 68
Despite its popularity with the courts, a DNA-convictedoffender-only exception to the warrant requirement is
unsatisfactory. Reasoning that a conviction works a perpetual
forfeiture of Fourth Amendment protection is disturbing. I
understand, of course, that convicts have a reduced
expectation of privacy while they are incarcerated, but why is
there a more permanent loss of privacy? Would we say that a
man or woman who was once convicted of a crime but has long
since completed the sentence has no claim to the protections of
the Fourth Amendment? That the police are free to enter his
home at their whim?
I propose dealing with the problem, not by diminishing the
rights of convicted offenders, but by recognizing a new, well
cabined “biometric identification exception” to the warrant
requirement. Certain dicta suggest that the Supreme Court
might uphold compulsory acquisition of biometric data from a
person when (1) the process is not physically or mentally
invasive, (2) the data are useful primarily to link individuals to
crime scenes or to establish the true identity of a given
individual, and (3) the data are valid, reliable, and effective for
this purpose. 69 In these circumstances, harms to individuals
and the benefits of judicial review are minor; hence, the
balance between individual privacy and government interests
points to the reasonableness of the collection and use of the
identifying data without a judicial warrant. Practices such as
taking fingerprints, mug-shots, and DNA even at the time of
an arrest could be sustained under this exception.
The biometric exception also has the virtue of opening up
public debate on the advisability of a population-wide
database. If we wanted to start to build such a database, we
could start now, as an addition to newborn screening
programs. The police would not need to collect or store the
samples. The resulting, comprehensive database—the records
68. Kaye, supra note 61, at 192.
69. See id. at 193.
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of the essentially random digits in each person’s DNA—would
have a variety of advantages. 70 For example, the inclusive
database could not be seen as disproportionately burdensome
on minorities, who, for a variety of reasons, tend to be swept
into the criminal justice system. According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, about one in three black males, one in six
Hispanic males, and one in seventeen white males will go to
prison during their lifetime. 71 If criminal databases mirror
these disparities, they will add to the corrosive perception that
the criminal justice system is stacked against AfricanAmericans and other minorities.
In the end, perhaps a population-wide database is not
desirable. I am not prepared to urge its implementation
tomorrow. But its time may come. Then the challenge will be
to construct it so as to enhance public order and security while
respecting legitimate individual privacy rights. The double
helix is not only an icon of the “molecule of life.” It also is a
metaphor for the intertwining of genetics and the law.
CONCLUSION
The science of human DNA identification has matured
greatly since its exuberant introduction in the late 1980s.
After years of bitter debates about laboratory techniques,
statistics, and population genetics, the admissibility of
properly conducted DNA tests of highly variable loci is no
longer in question. Along with this successful courtroom
implementation of DNA identification technology have come
increasingly aggressive uses of DNA in investigating crimes.
These developments have attracted the attention of
bioethicists and civil-liberties advocates. In evaluating the
expansion of DNA databases for law enforcement and other
uses of the forensic science, however, it cannot be assumed
that all the norms that are accepted and valuable in the
context for biomedical research with human subjects
necessarily are appropriate in the context of forensic
investigation with human suspects. Establishing reasonable

70. See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases:
Legality, Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS.
L. REV. 413 (2003).
71. Thomas P. Bonczar, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prevalence of
Imprisonment in the U.S. Population, 1974-2001 (2003), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/piusp01.htm.
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limits on the technological imperative requires an appreciation
and understanding of the law of criminal procedure, the costs
and benefits of the techniques, and the political and ethical
principles that foster a free society of autonomous individuals.
This brief review of history and current issues does not answer
the question of how far the technology of DNA identification
should be carried, but it does reveal that the question cannot
be ignored.

